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The demise of public order policing
On 13 April 2011 Andries Tatane, a teacher and local 
activist, was killed by officers of the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) during a protest in Ficksburg, 
a small town in the Free State, South Africa. Although 
the killing was captured live on video, all seven police 
officers involved in the incident were acquitted of the 
killing, as the state failed to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt who exactly had fired the deadly rubber bullets, 
and that there was ‘common purpose’ among the 
police officers involved in killing Tatane. This tragic 
and brutal killing is seen by many as a watershed 
moment, marking the definite return of police violence 
(repressive violence), well known from apartheid 
times.2 It brought broad public awareness – not least 
because the event had been captured on video – to 
a chain of similar incidences of police brutality during 
protests both prior to and after that of Tatane.3 This 
includes the Marikana shootings, where the police, 
armed with live ammunition, killed 34 striking miners 
who refused to disperse. Together these present a 
frightening picture of police failure to deal with public 
protests in a democratically acceptable manner.  
In this article, I do not discuss what is behind 
such policing, or whether the police are political 
instruments to suppress dissent, or even whether 
these incidences reveal police incapacity. While 
these are important questions that should inform our 
research agenda, I consider the issue from a different 
perspective: refracting the response by government 
to this crisis of protest policing firstly in the light of 
a long history of (public order) policing going back 
to the inception of policing in the 19th century, and 
secondly by comparing it to other more intimate 
forms of policing, such as the policing of domestic 
violence. 
The government’s public response to incidents 
such as those described in the introduction to this 
article has been to announce a steep increase in 
the capacity of public order policing. Through the 
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South Africa is witnessing a build-up of cases of public order policing gone wrong, in fact deadly wrong. Even 
the police are willing to admit that something is amiss. Yet the police response is a short-sighted one, which 
places the responsibility for the eruption of violence squarely with the people protesting, and underestimates 
its own role in aggravating the situation. I argue here that if the police wish to break the patterns of their long 
history of protecting a government and its partisan interests, and do not want to be misunderstood in their 
intention to serve the people, then simply increasing the capacity of public order policing will not help. On the 
contrary, we might end up (again) with a permanent occupying army. Instead the police have to become more 
explicitly partisan towards the citizens they serve, and help deliver the message inherent in each protest.1  
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refraction I show that such a policy decision not 
only risks repeating history in the short term but 
also places the SAPS at risk of falling back into the 
same purpose and patterns of policing as those that 
informed its inception in the 19th century. From the 
very beginning, South African policing has been over-
invested in public order policing to protect a partisan 
government and specific societal interests. 
Secondly, I show that a policy focused on increasing 
the capacity of public order policing is likely to further 
disappoint citizens’ wish for an effective police. I end 
this article with an aspirational call – that if the SAPS 
wishes to break these patterns of its long history and 
does not want to be misunderstood in its intention to 
serve the people, the service cannot hide behind the 
rule of law, neutrality or questions of capacity, but has 
to be more explicitly partisan towards the citizens it 
serves.  
This article is intended to stimulate thinking and 
debate about political policing. Drawing on Brodeur,4 
and how Steinberg5 has recently applied Brodeur’s 
idea of ‘high policing’, political policing can be 
explained as the explicit protection of government 
through the use of intelligence and extralegal force 
against people challenging government from outside 
or from within. Political policing, however, is also 
the biased enforcement of laws, or the enforcement 
of laws that are biased against a certain group or 
interest. In contrast to the idea of high policing, such 
notions of political policing diffuse the questions of 
agency, conspiracy and intentionality in favour of a 
more structural perspective. While in tension with 
each other, I would like to keep both notions in sight. 
Aside from the insights offered into the policing of 
domestic violence, this article is not based on original 
research but relies on secondary sources. While 
ethnographic research into the policing of protest 
would probably complicate the notion of political 
policing, I use it here in a normative way to stress the 
contrast with a form of policing that is relatively free 
from direct political instrumentalism and that accepts 
a constitutional democratic law as its primary source 
of authority. 
On a different route 
I would like to start by highlighting an irony. While 
many have condemned the brutality of current 
public order policing, and in so doing have tended 
to evoke the spectre of all-encompassing police 
repression, the SAPS has in fact been disinvesting 
itself substantially from public order policing in the 
past 15 years. This has mainly been done in order to 
deal with the pressure to reduce crime. In an effort to 
increase its legitimacy with the people of South Africa 
as well as its administrative accountability, it has 
allocated the bulk of its resources – both budgetary 
and personnel – to ‘ordinary’ crime fighting. 
In 2000, under the Thabo Mbeki government, which 
was often accused of not taking crime seriously, 
the police released the National Crime Combating 
Strategy (NCCS).6 This self-assertive reaction of 
the police to shift towards a results-driven crime 
combating strategy was a way to show that they 
were serious about crime.7 Soon after, in 2002, 
the dismantling of the Public Order Policing (POP) 
units began. First the POP units were turned into a 
‘reaction force’ of sorts, to be called on to respond 
to major crime operations such as bank robberies.8 
But the dismantling did not stop there. By 2007 the 
POP personnel were reduced by nearly two-thirds.9 
Officers were transferred to bolster daily police 
work at station level. Those who remained in the 
renamed Crime Combating Units, while nominally 
still responsible for public order, were also in practice 
re-deployed, more or less full time, to major crime-
fighting operations.10  
This left the public order police understaffed and 
undertrained, and unable to deal with the public 
dissatisfaction with a government failing to live up 
to expectations. In the light of history this change 
could be considered an unprecedented and 
even a progressive move, since policing in South 
Africa before the end of apartheid was generally 
characterised as being overused for crowd control 
purposes and underused for crime-fighting purposes. 
In that era, even where the police concentrated on 
responding to crime, the criminal offences often 
served as yet another way to keep black South 
Africans in a subjected state (e.g. pass laws). This 
bias was accentuated by the fact that police were 
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thinly spread, forcing difficult choices as to where to 
deploy their resources.11  
Political policing in the past 
From their inception in the 19th century, one of the 
primary roles of the police in South Africa, mounted 
and in paramilitary attire, was not to keep peace 
among people but to police territory and suppress 
internal resistance to colonial rule.12 These colonial 
regiments of mounted riflemen – at least in the British 
territories of Natal and the Cape – followed the model 
of the Royal Irish Constabulary, which had a long 
history and proven record of suppressing civil unrest 
and political agitation.13 Prior to Union in 1910, there 
was also no single police force. Mounted regiments 
were complemented with a potpourri of other police 
forces, such as special police for key infrastructure: 
railway police, private police for the mines, native 
administration police and town police. Each of 
the colonies had one such set of multiple police 
forces. But even where there were ‘town’ police, 
accountable to and paid by the respective town 
councils, like the one set up in Johannesburg at the 
turn of the previous century and which supposedly 
subscribed to a more civilian outlook, police officers 
were placed in service of the mining industries to 
forcefully manage their workforce.14 Three laws 
deserve particular mention here: the liquor laws, gold 
laws and pass laws. Together, their enforcement led 
to the mass incarceration of an otherwise innocent 
black population.15  
With the forging of Union, the plan was to have 
a highly centralised, single police force. At least, 
that was the fantasy of newly appointed Police 
Commissioner Theodorus Truter and people close 
to him who had the modernisation of the police at 
heart.16 Truter succeeded in centralising the force 
with control located firmly in Pretoria.17 However, 
the second aspect of the plan, to have only a single 
police force, was thwarted by the government 
(particularly the Ministry of Justice), which insisted 
on keeping a dual system: the South African Police 
(SAP) for the burgeoning cities, and the South African 
Mounted Riflemen (SAMR) for the countryside and to 
control ‘tribal rivalry’ and resistance to white rule. 
To leave no doubt about the role and methods of the 
SAMR, it was promulgated under the Defence Act of 
1912 instead of the Police Act of 1913. The SAMR 
was finally absorbed into the SAP after World War II. 
By then, however, unrest had in any event become a 
phenomenon of urban areas rather than rural areas, 
and the SAP had already taken over many internal 
security tasks, such as the quelling of protests and 
strikes.18 In fact, from its inception in 1913 the SAP 
was fully absorbed by such tasks. 
Consider a year such as 1914, in which the SAP first 
helped to suppress a railway strike, which turned 
into a general strike by white workers and was swiftly 
crushed by the police and military, acting with powers 
under martial law. In the same year the police were 
involved in suppressing the De la Rey rebellion, 
and, finally, the police helped with the conquest and 
occupation of German South West Africa. On the side 
of the police this drove a process of militarisation, 
with a bias towards drill and weapons training and 
the introduction of military ranks in 1919.19 By 1922 
it had even become thinkable to use the police in 
combination with air force bombings to end a strike 
by white workers.20 Still, the number of people killed 
in those interventions pales by comparison with how 
the police dealt with black resistance. In 1920 the 
SAP, led by the Commissioner himself, killed 200 
black people in an uprising in Bulhoek.21
Meanwhile, where the police were trying to deal 
with so-called ordinary crimes that threatened 
white people’s lives and property in the growing 
and industrialising cities at the beginning of the 
20th century, and which were rife, especially on 
the Witwatersrand, they were deeply caught up 
in inefficiency. This was shaped especially by 
corrupt entanglements with the various gangs and 
gangsters who – attracted by the unruly, male-
dominated capitalist precious metal business of early 
Johannesburg – populated the Reef.22 Also, the main 
efforts of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 
of the SAP were still focused on disciplining a mining 
workforce and the enforcement of the gold, liquor 
and pass laws.23 In fact, the ongoing raids on mining 
compounds and black living quarters in the city by 
the specialised Liquor and Gold branches could be 
considered an everyday version of crowd control. 
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Implausible as it might seem, police management 
tried to maintain a language of modernisation 
and an aspiration towards professionalism and 
independence by trying to secure better-educated 
recruits, by insisting on a civil police spirit, through 
technological advances in the field of forensics, and 
by maintaining the principle of the use of minimum 
force.24 However, these efforts only appeared in 
pure form in the wishful language of commemorative 
albums25 and the recommendations of various 
Commissions of Inquiry (e.g. the 1913 Commission 
of Inquiry into the Witwatersrand Riots and the 
1926 Water Commission). And while these might 
explain why a purely instrumental understanding of 
the police as the agent of dominant interests falls 
short, the police force itself often failed to concede its 
highly compromised character and its fundamental 
role in political policing. This is evident in budgetary 
priorities. Brewer shows that ‘[t]he proportion of the 
police budget spent on detective services, a measure 
of expenditure on civil police work, had fallen by a 
third in the 1926/7 financial year compared to the 
1914/15 financial year, while overall the police budget 
had doubled’.26 
And even where white middle-class citizens, who 
might have had some influence on what kind of 
police they wanted, expressed their unease about 
armed police officers patrolling their area, such 
liberal concerns were quickly overruled – with the 
consensus of these very citizens – when confronted 
with a growing urban under- and working class.27 
This structural constellation of bias toward crowd 
control – in its exceptional form mainly directed at 
white industrial strike action and Afrikaner rebellion, 
and in its mundane form mainly directed at a black 
working force – was at the root of the SAP from 
its inception. It reproduced itself over the years in 
different variations, strengths and proportions.28 
To mention one more important event in this long 
history: the 1976 Soweto student protest. Like 
today, riot policing as it was called then had been 
in a kind of slumber. Political resistance had been 
quelled in the early 1960s (after Sharpeville), and 
the previous years had been relatively quiet in terms 
of public protest. When the protest happened, 
police intervened brutally. This was partly the effect 
of its ongoing political policing mission. But it was 
also a consequence of sheer incompetence and 
unpreparedness.29 The reaction of the police in 
the following months and years was to deal with 
this unpreparedness by increasing its riot police 
manpower, and strengthening its chains of command 
and protective measures for police officers.30 This 
culminated in the highly militarised police of the 
1980s, with very little capacity and will to respond to 
ordinary crime. 
The desire for a strong state 
It is necessary to remember that the political bias in 
policing largely left black areas to their own devices in 
creating a means of safe living.31 This gap was filled 
at different times with different formations of informal 
justice. It was a form of self-rule that was sometimes 
politically (locally) legitimate, but at other times highly 
divisive in inter-generational and class conflicts. It 
often got out of hand and turned from sanctioned 
force to menace; sometimes it was initiated and 
even paid (or rather, underpaid) for by the state. 
Sometimes it was reined in by the state. Mostly, 
though, it was just ignored as a necessary if not 
useful evil in a divide and rule policy.32 This normalised 
the experience of a lack of security as public good, 
and of highly authoritarian and rather immediate 
forms of punishment.33 
Together with post-apartheid’s democratic promises 
of inclusion and new infrastructure, such as 
community policing, to bring the police closer to the 
people,34, 35 this has produced a highly ambiguous 
yearning for the force of the state, which can be 
otherwise read as a yearning for a private relationship 
with the state.36 The expectation is that policing 
intervenes forcefully (not particularly constrained by 
human rights) in one’s own favour and for one’s own 
protection.37
This is apparent, for example, in the policing of 
domestic violence, where a call for the police is 
often an expression of the desire for a protective 
but authoritative figure, who can at least match a 
husband’s violence and rein him in on behalf of the 
wife or partner. But it also comes through in the 
policing of public protest. In fact, I would propose, 
to put matters starkly, that public order policing 
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is not very different from, and just as protracted, 
as the policing of domestic violence. The violence 
itself is the result of a failure of communication and 
symptomatic of conditions of (gender) inequalities 
and economic disempowerment. Most importantly, 
it is the epiphenomenon of a structural situation, 
which the police alone cannot change. In many 
domestic violence cases, most women do not want 
to get rid of their husbands,38 but simply want them 
to behave differently. We could say the same about 
municipalities. It is mostly not the legitimacy of the 
government as such that is at stake, but rather how 
things work, or not, that leads to protest and the 
involvement of the police. In the case of domestic 
violence, police intervention is often desired in the 
hope that it will change the behaviour of the husband, 
at least in the moment, as the fight is happening.39 
When it comes to public protests, calls are 
sometimes made directly to the police to deal with a 
particular case creating insecurity within a community. 
Even when the call goes to other divisions of the local 
council, the police remain the most tangible visible 
manifestation of the state, and become the frontline 
recipients of the message (of anger).40 Policing 
thus serves as a rallying point to hold government 
accountable and make people’s suffering heard. 
This is important, as it marks a difference between 
policing now and in the late apartheid era: there is 
a demand for actual policing. While this demand 
might be misplaced at times in its wish for violence 
against others, it remains a hope for an effective 
police service. I posit that this offers an opportunity 
for the police to win over and build legitimacy among 
a populace calling for more security and a functioning 
state.
Yet the manner in which this demand is responded 
to leads to constant disappointment, and instead 
produces antagonism towards the police. As with 
domestic violence, when the police intervene in 
public protest they often appear to be intervening 
on behalf of someone else.41 This may be a real or 
imagined other. There is a spectrum of possibility 
between a police force instrumentalised to crush a 
protest with well-known apartheid policing methods, 
and a police service ‘merely’ acting biased towards 
its own occupational rationale of self-defence and 
the preservation of its authority, but with such 
incompetence that it translates into policing-against-
the-people. 
Either way, the intervention of the police mostly 
disappoints and in fact aggravates the situation.42 It 
is not only that the police cannot solve the situation, 
but that the very act of policing provokes retaliation. 
Protesters may feel violated and silenced, and the 
sense of violence suffered is recast as a form of 
political sacrifice,43 leading people into subsequent 
protests with the expectation that further sacrifice 
might be necessary. If nothing else is solved, police 
intervention will certainly only produce an increased 
need for intervention. 
Making things worse
The ability of the police to aggravate the situation is 
often highly underestimated and misunderstood by 
those who order the police to intervene, and even 
more so by the police themselves.44 There might 
be some theoretical awareness that the police can 
choose between a calming or escalatory approach, 
between a minimum of force and a maximum of 
force approach.45 And to be fair, the police have been 
retrained in public order policing and this has been 
seen as one of the successes of transformation,46 
at least before the public order police unit was 
dismantled. But the police are still used as if they are 
outside of the conflict, and as if they are a surgical 
instrument that can repair the situation by removing 
the trouble or quelling the spilling of blood. They are 
not sufficiently seen as an integral element of the 
conflict itself. 
A recent ethnographic description of protest against 
the hosting of the World Cup in Brazil remarks how 
quickly protesters’ sentiments regarding the police 
can turn. When the protest started, people mixed 
their anti-FIFA messages with the message of ‘sem 
violencia’ (without violence), hoping for a pact of 
solidarity with the police. But the police did not 
respond to the call and instead used a pre-emptive 
display of might and violence, occasionally throwing 
stun grenades and preventing the demonstrators 
from moving to the centre of town to deliver their 
message. While the demonstration did not turn 
violent, the author powerfully describes a sense of 
disenchantment about what is politically possible: 
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‘While the chant “without violence” didn’t lose its 
poetry, it didn’t move me the way it did before 
the interruption. The pact seemed to have been 
broken’.47 
So-called crowd psychology has provided substantial 
insights into these sometimes very subtle, but 
potentially highly consequential dynamics, described 
here from an ethnographic perspective. It shows 
how police intervention is absolutely crucial to 
what happens at a gathering; how police have the 
possibility of either giving people the sense that 
movement is possible or that a horizon is closed; and 
how police themselves are mainly responsible for 
escalating hostility. An important point is that crowds 
are hardly ever homogeneous. There is always a 
broad spectrum of people in a crowd, from those 
who are willing to police themselves, to people who 
are prepared to use violence.48 It is police action, 
which confuses the acts of a few with the acts of a 
whole crowd, and which imagines the crowd as a 
homogeneous (and violent) entity, that leads a crowd 
to unite and halt communication. This was certainly 
the case in Marikana, where the criminal acts of 
some tainted the whole group of demonstrators as 
criminal.49 To avoid an escalation of violence – in the 
moment as much as over a long period of time – the 
police need to always assume that the crowd is there 
to deliver a message and that the primary role of the 
police is to facilitate the deliverance of that message. 
Delivering the message is not simply a question of 
sticking to the rule of law. As many people writing 
about the police have shown, the police work 
according to a set of informal organisational rules, 
while the law is often only evoked in retrospect.50 
It is here in this informal operational realm that bias 
creeps in, often leading to disappointment because 
demonstrators are being vilified. In the case of 
domestic violence, to pick up the analogy again, 
the police lose patience with women who do not 
follow through with the law and the charges they 
laid against their husbands or partners. But this is 
where the police have to anchor the bias to make 
their intentions to serve the people explicit. It is in this 
informal realm, where neutrality doesn’t exist anyway, 
that the police have to make their choice. 
The police cannot change inequality and 
unemployment, but in the case of domestic violence 
they can arrest a perpetrator, whose release the 
wife or partner may well demand the next day, 
without retaliating against her and not ignoring her 
call the next time she seeks help. In the case of 
public protest it means explicitly – if not complicitly 
– choosing the side of the protestors and helping to 
deliver the message. 
An example of how this might work is taken from 
Waddington, who observed the negotiations between 
representatives of a far-left anarchist group and 
Metropolitan Police officers in Britain during the early 
1990s.  The declared aspiration of the protesters was 
to ‘tear down the fabric of capitalism’, to which the 
Superintendent conducting the meeting replied, ‘And 
how can we help you?’51
Quo vadis, political policing? 
There appears to be little chance of such a radical 
mind shift in the current approach to police 
intervention. Instead, like after 1976, the primary 
reaction to police failure to deal with public protest 
has been the promise to bring back and build 
even more public order capacity than ever before. 
Admittedly this will be done under a paradigm of 
the rule of law,52 but soon there are supposed to 
be 9 000 police officers ready to deal with public 
protests all over the country.53 It is clear that since 
nothing is likely to change in terms of people’s 
demands, the role of the police is pretty much set to 
become that of an ongoing occupying army – unless, 
perhaps, they stay on their difficult course, seeking to 
get their response to ordinary crime right, and making 
sure that protest does not increase because of their 
interventions. In this way they might learn to do the 
impossible: making protest effective, even if they 
have to insist that they can only do their job if they 
put themselves behind the demand of the protesters, 
for example by having the councillor receive a 
memorandum. What we need is a complicit police, 
complicit not in the inertia, but complicit in bringing 
about change. 
To comment on this article visit 
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